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 §1 Introduction 
 In §12 of his 1837  magnum opus , the  Wissenschaftslehre , Bolzano remarks 
that “In the new logic textbooks one reads almost constantly that ‘in 
logic one must consider not the material of thought but the mere form 
of thought, for which reason logic deserves the title of a purely formal 
science’” ( WL §12, 46). 1 The sentence Bolzano quotes is his own summary 
of others’ philosophical views; he goes on to cite Jakob, Hoffbauer, Metz, 
and Krug as examples of thinkers who held that logic abstracts from the 
matter of thought and considers only its form. Although Bolzano does 
not mention Kant by name here, Kant does of course hold that “pure 
general logic”, what Bolzano would consider logic in the traditional 
sense (the theory of propositions, representations, inferences, etc.), is 
formal. As Kant remarks in the Introduction to the 2nd edition of  Kritik 
der reinen Vernunft , (pure general) logic is “justified in abstracting – is 
indeed obliged to abstract – from all objects of cognition and all of their 
differences; and in logic, therefore, the understanding has to do with 
nothing further than itself and its own form” ( KrV , Bix). 2 
 In recent work, both John MacFarlane and Sandra Lapointe have 
argued that this ‘formality thesis’ is original to Kant; according to them, 
no one in the pre-Kantian, Leibnizian logical tradition held that logic 
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is about the form of thinking. 3 As MacFarlane points out, the claim 
that logic is formal is now so widespread that it is often simply asserted 
without argument. So in criticizing the formality thesis in these post-
Kantian figures (whom Lapointe aptly dubs ‘Kantian logicians’) Bolzano 
is really targeting one of Kant’s most influential ideas in the philosophy 
of logic. 
 Bolzano raises two distinct objections to the formality thesis. First, 
he objects that the formality thesis, as formulated at least by Kant and 
the Kantian logicians, assumes that logic is about thoughts [ Gedanken ], 4 
which Bolzano takes to be, roughly, mental states with propositional 
content. Logic is not about thoughts so conceived, Bolzano argues 
throughout the  WL , or anything else psychological, but about ‘prop-
ositions in themselves’ [ Sätze an  sich ], abstract bearers of truth-values 
that stand in entailment relations, and ‘representations in themselves’ 
[ Vorstellungen an  sich ], the mind-independent concepts that constitute 
propositions ‘ an  sich ’. But this objection arises from Bolzano’s very 
general opposition to psychologism; it is not specifically a problem for 
the formality thesis. For the defender of the formality thesis could, in 
principle, claim that logic concerns propositions ‘ an  sich ’ in respect of 
their form. 
 I want to focus, instead, on Bolzano’s second objection, which is 
specifically about the notion of ‘form’ in the formality thesis. Bolzano 
begins by pointing out that “this explanation [that logic is about the 
form of thought] appears to be, in part, insufficiently clear and, in part 
insufficiently determinate” and proceeds to explain one clear sense in 
which logic might be said to concern the  forms of propositions, which 
Bolzano finds relatively unproblematic. Logic concerns not individual 
propositions, except perhaps as examples, but whole sets of propositions 
that share structural (formal) features. For instance, in logic we regard 
<All men are mortal> and <All dogs are mammals> as having the same 
form because they are instances of the same scheme: <All As are B>. 5 
Two propositions  p and  q are said to have the same form if by consistent 
substitution of terms in  p we can obtain  q . This, Bolzano remarks, is a 
 3  MacFarlane (2002) and Lapointe (2012). 
 4  “All of the scholars who have made the claims quoted above tacitly assume 
that the totality of things that constitute the subject-matter of logic fall under 
the concept of  thought , i.e. that all of them, whatever else they might be, must be 
 thoughts ” ( WL §12, 47). 
 5  Though Bolzano would not take this to be their form, for, on his view, the 
fundamental form of the proposition is <A has b>. 
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perfectly coherent notion of form, and in this sense logic can correctly 
be said to concern the  forms of propositions. 
 If ‘formality’ in the formality thesis means something other than 
this, Bolzano claims, then Kant and the Kantian logicians have failed to 
explain what it is, to clearly demarcate the forms of propositions from 
their ‘matter’, or to explain why logic should be restricted to the formal 
study of propositions, in this other, specifically Kantian sense of ‘form’. 6 
 The idea that logic is formal has proved very durable, and, further-
more, Bolzano’s ‘substitutional’ conception of the formality of logic has 
entered the mainstream of philosophical thought. Alfred Tarski’s defini-
tion of the formality of logic in “The Concept of Logical Consequence” 
(1936) in particular is similar to Bolzano’s, as Lapointe (2011) points 
out. 7 This raises an important question: was Bolzano right about Kant’s 
version of the formality thesis? Is there more to Kant’s formality thesis 
than what Bolzano’s substitutional conception of formality allows, and, 
if so, can this additional Kantian conception of formality be made clear 
(contra Bolzano) and defensible? 
 In this essay I am going to argue that the answer to both questions is 
‘yes’. There is more to the formality of logic in Kant’s sense than Bolzano’s 
‘substitutional’ understanding of formality, and this Kantian conception 
of formality can be rendered reasonably clear and defensible. In Section 
§2 I explain Bolzano’s substitutional understanding of the formality of 
logic. In Section §3 I argue that Kant does think that logic is formal in 
Bolzano’s substitutional sense. However, in Section §4 I argue that, on 
Kant’s view, the fact that logic is substitution-formal is a  consequence of 
the fact that logic is formal in Kant’s sense of ‘formal’; it is not what 
the formality of logic, for Kant, consists in. The formality of logic for 
Kant is closely tied up with the matter/form distinction and I distin-
guish several different classes of logical items to which Kant applies that 
distinction: concepts, judgments, and inferences [ Schlüsse ] are all said 
to have a matter and a form. I argue that close attention to Kant’s texts 
shows that the formality of logic ultimately consists in the fact that 
logic concerns the  form of the capacity for thought itself, not merely 
the  form of its products (concepts, judgments, inferences). The form of 
the capacity explains the form of its products. That logic is about the 
 6  Bolzano makes a similar objection to Kant’s theory of analyticity in terms of 
conceptual ‘containment’ – that it is a metaphor that Kant has not cashed out in 
literal terms. See  WL §148, 87. 
 7  However, others have argued that Tarski’s conception is quite different than 
Bolzano’s. See Siebel (1996) and (2002); and Rusnock and Burke (2010). 
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form of thought explains why logic is only concerned with the forms of 
propositions, hence, why logic is substitution-formal in Bolzano’s sense. 
In Section §5 I explore what Kant could mean by talking of the ‘form’ 
of a faculty (a capacity) and I propose that the form of a faculty is what 
Aristotle would call the ‘formal cause’ of that faculty: it is that which 
makes the faculty the faculty that it is. In claiming that logic concerns 
the form of understanding, Kant is claiming that logic discovers laws 
that apply to the faculty of understanding  in virtue of being the faculty 
that it is . I then give a Kantian characterization of what it is to be the 
capacity for thought, and why this entails that certain laws (the laws of 
logic) apply to the activity of that capacity. I conclude by arguing that 
this explains why the products of this capacity (in particular, inferences) 
have the features that Bolzano identifies as their formality: validity 
under substitution. 
 §2 The substitutional account of formality: Bolzano 
 In  WL §12 Bolzano explains the sense in which logic can correctly be 
said to be formal, which I have called the ‘substitutional’ conception of 
the formality of logic:
 For these reasons logic (at least in its doctrines – it can be otherwise in 
the examples) never considers a fully determinate proposition [ Satz ], 
i.e. one in which the subject, predicate, and copula are fully specified, 
but, rather, a whole class [ Gattung ] of propositions, i.e. all propositions 
collectively, which, if some of their components are completely fixed, 
the remainder can be read in this or that way. [ ... ] If one calls such 
classes of propositions general  forms of propositions [ ... ] then one can 
say that logic concerns only the forms of propositions, never individual 
propositions. If one calls that which is left indeterminate in such a class 
of propositions, such as  A and  B in the previous example, the  matter of 
these propositions [ ... ] then one can also say that logic concerns only 
the form, not the matter, of propositions. ( WL §12, 48) 
 Although he does not directly state the definition of the form of a prop-
osition, it is not difficult to reconstruct such a definition that would be 
acceptable on Bolzano’s lights. I will proceed in two steps: first I will 
define what it is for two propositions to be formally equivalent, then 
I will define what the form of a proposition is. At each stage I follow 
Bolzano’s characteristic procedure of defining the notion (being formally 
equivalent, having this or that logical form) relative to a designated set 
of terms (i, j, k ... ) and then defining the absolute notion. 
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 Propositions, for Bolzano, are structured complexes of representa-
tions. To define formal equivalence of propositions we need, first, to 
define what is a ‘substitution’. Where  p is a proposition and i, j, k ...  is an 
ordered sequence of representations in  p , a substitution for i, j, k, ...  in  p 
is a function  f from that sequence to a sequence, of the same length, of 
representations of the same syntactic type, i*, j*, k*, etc. The substitution 
of  f in  p refers to the proposition that is obtained from  p by replacing i 
with i*, j with j*, k with k*, etc. Two propositions  p and  q are said to be 
formally equivalent with respect to representations i, j, k, ...  where i, j, 
k, ...  are representations in  p , if and only if there is a substitution  f that, 
when applied to  p , produces  q . For instance, the two propositions 
 (1)  <Men have ears> 
 (2)  <Cows have ears> 
 are formally identical with respect to <men> because (2) can be obtained 
from (1) by substituting <cows> for <men>. Proposition (1) is formally 
equivalent to 
 (3)  <Dogs have fleas> 
 with respect to <men> and <ears>, because (3) can be obtained from (1) 
by substituting concepts for concepts: <dogs> for <men> and <fleas> for 
<ears>. We can represent all three propositions (1)–(3) as substitution 
instances of the abstract schema:
 (4)  <A have b> 
 We will say that two propositions  p and  q are absolutely formally equiva-
lent in Bolzano’s sense if there is a substitution  f of all of the non-logical 
terms in  p that, when applied to  p , produces  q . 8 Propositions (1)−(3) are 
absolutely formally equivalent. 
 8  As Bolzano himself points out later in the  WL , this definition relies on being 
able to distinguish the logical terms from the non-logical terms. We need to 
restrict the range of terms that can be substituted to ‘non-logical’ or ‘non-formal’ 
features, or else we will obtain the absurd result: <P & Q> has the same form as 
<P → Q> because we can obtain the latter from the former by substituting → for &. 
The plausibility of this definition of logical form depends upon drawing a princi-
pled distinction between the ‘formal’ (or logical) terms in propositions and their 
‘material’ (or non-logical) terms, a problem philosophers of logic have discussed 
down to the present day. Cf. Woods (forthcoming) for further discussion. 
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 Having defined a notion of formal equivalence, we can now define the 
logical form of a proposition as the class of all propositions with which 
it is formally equivalent. The form of a proposition  p with respect to its 
terms i, j, k ...  is the class of all propositions that are formally equivalent 
to  p with respect to i, j, k, . ... We can adopt the following notational 
convention: the form of a proposition  p with respect to i, j, k, ...  will be 
indicated by replacing i, j, k, ...  with variables. Any substitution instance 
of that scheme will be a proposition that is formally equivalent to  p 
with respect to those terms. For instance, the form of (1) with respect to 
<men> can be represented as 
 (5)  <A have ears> 
 Similarly, we can define the absolute logical form of a proposition  p 
as the class of all propositions that are absolutely formally equivalent 
to  p . 9 
 When Bolzano claims in §12 of the  WL that logic is formal he means 
that logic concerns itself with forms of propositions in this precise sense. 
Logic does not study individual propositions, but whole classes of prop-
ositions that share a logical form. Logic studies classes of propositions 
that share a logical form because propositions have many of their most 
important logical properties in virtue of their logical form. Some caution 
is required here. It would be misleading to say that, on Bolzano’s view, 
 all of logic is formal in this substitutional sense. Bolzano uses ‘logic’ 
in both a wide and a narrow sense. In the wide sense, ‘logic’ refers to 
the philosophical discipline of ‘ Wissenschaftslehre ’ itself ( WL §6, 22), 
the general theory of any scientific knowledge whatsoever. For instance, 
logic-as- Wissenschaftslehre includes in its field of study the distinc-
tion between  a priori and  a  posteriori knowledge, and how the former 
is possible. Since the property of being  a priori knowable is clearly not 
 9  Trivially, absolute formal equivalence is reflexive (since every proposition 
is equivalent to itself under the trivial substitution that maps every representa-
tion to itself). Likewise, if there is a substitution  f that takes  p to  q , then there 
is a substitution that takes  q to  p , so absolute formal equivalence is symmetric. 
Finally, if there is a substitution that takes  p to  q , and one that takes  q to  r , there 
is a substitution that takes  p to  r , so absolute formal equivalence is transitive. 
Consequently, the absolute logical form of a proposition is its equivalence class 
under the relation of absolute formal equivalence. It follows that two proposi-
tions  p and  q are absolutely formally equivalent if and only if they have the same 
absolute logical form. The logical form of propositions (1)–(3) can be represented 
as (4). 
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shared by propositions in virtue of their common logical form, Bolzano 
cannot mean that logic in the broader sense is formal. However, Bolzano 
also has a narrower conception of logic on which logic is the science of 
the relations between propositions, representations, inferences, etc., the 
domain of logic as traditionally conceived. On this narrower concep-
tion, ‘logic’ is roughly equivalent to what Kant would call ‘pure general 
logic’, although of course they have quite different conceptions of what 
that logic is and how it should be done. Henceforth, when I talk about 
‘logic’ in Bolzano I mean logic in the narrow sense. 
 We can now formulate the Bolzano substitutional formality thesis 
(SFT) more precisely: 
 (SFT)  Property F is a proper object of study for logic if and only if 
propositions have property F in virtue of their logical form. 
 One corollary of this claim is the following:
 (C)  Property F is a proper object of study for logic if and only if, 
for any propositions  p and  q that share the same form (they 
are formally equivalent to one another),  p has property F if 
and only if  q has property F. 
 I will illustrate this point in the case of Bolzano’s theory of logical 
‘ Ableitbarkeit ’ because this corresponds most closely to what has come to 
be seen as a (if not the) central concept in logic, logical consequence, and 
will facilitate the comparison with Kant’s theory of logical inference. 10 
 Since Bolzano’s own definition of logical  Ableitbarkeit is formulated in 
his own, not always very natural, technical notation, I will quote, with 
my own slight modifications, Sandra Lapointe’s gloss on this definition 
in  Bolzano’s Theoretical Philosophy (2011):
Let  P = { p 1 ,  p 2 ,  p 3 , ... } and  Q = { q 1 ,  q 2 ,  q 3 , ... } be sets of propositions. The 
 Q propositions are logically  ableitbar from the  P propositions if and 
only if:
 (i)  There is a substitution for the non-logical terms in  P and Q that 
makes all of the propositions in  P and all the propositions in  Q 
true ( P and  Q are said to be ‘compatible’). 
 10  This discussion of  Ableitbarkeit is heavily indebted to the discussion in 
Lapointe (2011), Chapter 6. 
 
Kant, Bolzano, and the Formality of Logic 199
 (ii)  For every substitution of the non-logical terms in  P and  Q , if all 
of the propositions in  P are true under this substitution, then 
all of the propositions in  Q are true under this substitution. 
(Lapointe 2011, 73–74;  WL §155) 11 
 Since I will only be discussing Bolzano’s notion of ‘logical  Ableitbarkeit ’ 
(rather than the more general notion), I will drop the modifier and 
refer to this as  Ableitbarkeit simpliciter. Let  P and  Q be as in the defini-
tion and let  P * = { p * 1,  p * 2, . ... } be a set of propositions, where each  p n is 
absolutely formally equivalent to  p * n . A short argument proves that  Q is 
also logically  ableitbar from  P *. By clause (i) of the definition of logical 
 Ableitbarkeit , there is at least one way of substituting for the non-logical 
terminology in the  P propositions and the  Q propositions that make all 
the propositions in both sets come out true. But for every substitution 
of the non-logical vocabulary in  p n there is a corresponding substitu-
tion of the non-logical vocabulary in  p * n such that these substitutions 
will produce the same proposition; they will not in general be the same 
 substitution , for  p n and  p * n will not have the same non-logical vocabulary. 
So there is at least one substitution of the non-logical terminology in 
the  P * propositions and the  Q propositions that make all the proposi-
tions in both sets come out true. In Bolzano’s terminology, these two 
sets of propositions are compatible. This satisfies clause (i) of the defini-
tion of the logical  Ableitbarkeit of  Q from  P* . Next, we will prove that 
clause (ii) obtains as well (for  P* and  Q ). Each  p n is absolutely formally 
equivalent to the corresponding  p * n . By definition, this means that 
for every substitution of the non-logical terms in  p * n , there is a corre-
sponding substitution of non-logical terms in  p n such that these two 
substitutions will produce the same proposition. So for any substitution 
of non-logical terms that makes all of  P* true, there is a corresponding 
substitution of non-logical terms that makes all of  P true. By assump-
tion, for any substitution of non-logical terms in  P and  Q , if all of the 
 P propositions are made true, all of the  Q propositions are made true. 
So, for any substitution of the non-logical vocabulary in  P * and  Q , if all 
of the  P * propositions are true, all of the  Q propositions are true. So the 
set of propositions  Q is  ableitbar from the set of propositions  P *. Similar 
reasoning will show that if  P is  ableitbar from  Q then P* is  ableitbar from 
 11  I have modified Lapointe’s presentation slightly; rather than first define 
 Ableitbarkeit relative to a set of terms, then define the absolute notion of 
 Ableitbarkeit , I have defined the absolute notion of  Ableitbarkeit from the 
beginning. 
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 Q as well. In other words, relations of  Ableitbarkeit are shared by sets 
of propositions that have the same logical form. Or, to put it another 
way, relations of  Ableitbarkeit are formal features of sets of propositions. 
Given the substitution-formality thesis (SFT) from above, this explains 
why  Ableitbarkeit is a proper object of study for logic. 
 §3 The substitutional account of formality: Kant 
 In this section I will argue that, on this point, Kant agrees with Bolzano: 
Kantian pure general logic is formal in Bolzano’s substitutional sense. 
Kant accepts the SFT from above. This is not the only coherent sense in 
which logic can be said to be formal, according to Kant, but my argu-
ment for that must wait until the next section. Since I have focused 
on the formality of  Ableitbarkeit in Bolzano’s logic, I will focus on the 
closest corresponding notion in Kant’s logic, his theory of logical infer-
ences [ Schlüsse ]. First, though, we must explore Kant’s conception of the 
logical form of the judgments that figure in such inferences. 
 Kantian judgments are unified wholes composed of concepts. The 
structure or unifying principle of a judgment is called its logical form. 
The table of logical functions in judging characterizes the logical forms 
of judgments according to four ‘moments’: quantity, quality, relation, 
and modality. Under each ‘moment’ of the table of logical functions 
there are three types of judgment:
  1.  Quantity 
  Universal 
  Particular 
  Singular 
  2. Quality  3. Relation 
  Affirmative  Categorical 
  Negative Hypothetical 
  Infinite  Disjunctive  
  4.  Modality 
  Problematic 
  Assertoric 
  Apodictic 12 
 Every judgment has a quantity, a quality, a relation, and a modality. 
This means that every judgment is either universal, particular, or 
 12  KrV A70/B95.  
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singular in quantity; affirmative, negative, or infinite in quality, etc. For 
reasons I do not have the space to explore here, Kant claims that within 
pure general logic we cannot distinguish between the third judgmental 
form and the first two in the moments of quantity and quality. 13 This 
means that, for the purposes of pure general logic, the Kantian logic 
with which we are concerned here, we can ignore singular and infinite 
judgments. Likewise, the modality of a judgment, according to Kant, 
does not concern the form of the judgment itself, but the relation of 
that judgment to the mind; 14 consequently, the modality of judgments 
does not affect their role in syllogistic inference, and I will forgo further 
discussion of it here. 
 The logical form of a judgment is uniquely characterized by its logical 
quality, quantity, relation, and modality. Two judgments have the 
same form if and only if, through consistent substitution of concepts, 
one can be transformed into the other. For instance, consider the two 
judgments:
 (1)  <Some Greeks are Athenian> 
 (2)  <Some dogs are Alsatians> 
 Through substituting <dogs> for <Greeks> and <Alsatian> for <Athenian>, 
(1) can be transformed into (2); (1) and (2) have the same logical form: 
they are particular (in quantity), affirmative (in quality) categorical (in 
relation) judgments (ignoring for the moment their modality). If we 
refer to the concepts of which these judgments as composed as their 
matter, then we can say: judgments with the same form can differ in 
matter, or, equivalently, a judgment is a complex whole of some matter 
structured according to one of the possible logical forms. 
 Kant claims that in the moments of quantity and quality the third 
type of judgment cannot be distinguished from the first type by pure 
general logic (for Bolzano, ‘logic’ in the narrower sense), but only by 
‘transcendental logic’, the philosophical discipline that “concerns the 
origin of our cognitions of objects insofar as that [cognition] cannot 
be ascribed to the objects” (A55–56/B80). In this essay, I am concerned 
exclusively with Kant’s pure general logic, so I will ignore the posi-
tive claim that transcendental logic can distinguish the third logical 
 13  KrV A71-72/B96-97. See Stang (2012) for further discussion of why infinite 
judgment cannot be distinguished within pure general logic. 
 14  KrV A74/B99-100. 
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function of quantity and of quality and the difficulties surrounding the 
notion of ‘transcendental logic’ 15 but I will briefly comment on what it 
means that, within pure general logic, we cannot distinguish universal 
judgments from singular (quantity), or affirmative judgments from infi-
nite (quality). Very roughly, Kant’s idea is that  with respect to inferential 
relations singular judgments behave just like universal judgments (the 
moment of quantity) and infinite judgments behave just like affirma-
tive judgments (the moment of quality). So from within pure general 
logic, the science tasked with studying the inferential relations among 
judgments, we cannot distinguish these two kinds of judgments. I will 
illustrate the point in the case of affirmative judgments and infinite 
judgments; 16 the case of singular and universal judgments brings in 
additional complications. 17 
 Consider two kinds of judgments that can be distinguished within 
general logic, affirmative and negative judgments, for example. 
 (1)  Socrates is Athenian. [Affirmative] 
 (2)  Socrates is not Athenian. [Negative] 
 In Kant’s logic, these judgments have, respectively, the logical forms 
 (1*)  A is B 
 (2*)  ~(A is B) 
 The negation in (2*) takes wide scope (over the whole judgment) because 
it applies to the copula; 18 (2*) says that the predicative relationship 
asserted in (1*) fails to obtain. However, we might also negate, not the 
copula as in (1) itself, but the predicate, as in:
 (3)  Socrates is non-Athenian [Infinite] 
 whose corresponding logical form is (3*):
 (3*)   A is (~B) 
 Judgment (3) asserts that Socrates falls within the infinite sphere of 
everything outside the sphere of the concept <Athenian>. That pure 
 15  See, however, Stang (2012) for an explanation of why infinite judgments are 
distinct from affirmative judgments in transcendental logic. 
 16  The main discussion of this in the  KrV is A72/B97. 
 17  See A71/B96. 
 18  Cf. Ak. 24:758. 
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general logic cannot distinguish (3*) means that, from the point of view 
of pure general logic, (3) is an affirmative judgment; it affirmatively 
predicates the concept <non-Athenian> of Socrates. Consequently, it 
has the inferential role, with respect to other judgments containing the 
concepts <Socrates> and <non-Athenian> that any affirmative judg-
ment does. For instance, the following is a valid instance of the schema 
for categorical syllogisms: 
 Socrates is non-Athenian (3) [X is A] 
 All non-Athenians are warlike. [All A are B] 
 ... Socrates is warlike. [X is B] 
 However, (3) has a different inferential role from (1), because (1) and (3) 
are affirmative judgments with distinct and  unrelated (from the point 
of view of general logic) predicates. Nor is the inferential role of (3) the 
same as the inferential role of (2), for (at least within pure general logic), 
substituting (2) for (3) in the syllogism above renders it invalid. The 
difference between (1) and (3) concerns not the form of the judgment 
 itself but the form of the predicate, <~A> as opposed to <A>. Pure general 
logic cannot account for the difference between these predicates; to 
do so, we need to bring in considerations of how our  a priori concepts 
obtain content (relation to an object), and this is a subject for transcen-
dental logic. 19 
 Kant’s theory of inference, following the Aristotelian tradition, is a 
theory of syllogistic inference. A syllogism contains two premises (a 
major and a minor) and a conclusion. He divides syllogisms into three 
kinds, based on the logical form of their major premise: categorical, 
hypothetical, and disjunctive. I will begin with the best developed part 
of Kant’s theory of inference, the theory of categorical syllogisms, which 
is encoded in this table: 20 
MP
SM
PM
SM
MP
MS
PM
MS
SP SP SP SP
 19  This is Kant’s ‘official’ view about infinite judgments in pure general logic. 
However, there are reasons to worry that he is not completely consistent on this 
point. See below for more. 
 20  JL §68, Ak. 9:125. 
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 ‘S’ stands for the subject-concept of the conclusion, ‘P’ for its predi-
cate, and ‘M’ for its middle term. Each column represents a categorical 
syllogistic ‘figure’, that is, a kind of a logically valid categorical syllo-
gism. In each figure, the top line represents the major premise, the 
middle the minor premise, and the line on the bottom, below the black 
line, represents the conclusion. In each judgment, the left-hand vari-
able indicates the subject-concept, and the right-hand variable indicates 
the predicate concept. For instance, the third syllogistic figure, the third 
column from the left, indicates that syllogisms of this figure have the 
following form: 
  Subject  Predicate 
 Major premise:  M  P 
 Minor premise:  M  S 
 Conclusion:  S  P 
 The logical quantity and quality of the premises and conclusions are 
not specified, though, because each syllogistic figure includes under it 
several sub-cases that fully specify the logical forms of its constituent 
judgments. 
 Kant analyses the validity of syllogisms of the other three figures by 
showing how they can be reduced to syllogisms of the first-figure by 
certain conversion rules. First, I will show that the validity of a cate-
gorical syllogism of the first-figure is substitution-formal in the sense 
defined earlier. Then I will show that the conversion rules that trans-
form syllogisms of the other three figures are themselves substitution-
formal. I will then argue that the validity of  all categorical syllogisms is 
substitution-formal. In fact, it is a trivial (though laborious) exercise to 
enumerate every possible example of a valid categorical syllogism and 
manually check that they are all substitution-formal. 
 A syllogism is of the first-figure just in case (i) the concepts in its major, 
minor and conclusion can be obtained by substitution from the scheme 
in the above table, (ii) the major premise is universal (either negative or 
affirmative), and (ii) the minor premise is affirmative (either universal or 
particular). This gives us four possible sub-cases of the first-figure: 
  I.1  I.2 
 Major :  All M are P  All M are P 
 Minor :  All S are M  Some S are M 
 Conclusion :  All S are P  Some S are P 
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  I.3 (invalid)  I.4 (invalid)  
 Major :  Not all M are P  Not all M are P 
 Minor :  All S are M  Some S are M 
 Conclusion :  Not all S are P  Not all S are P 
 Since I.3 and I.4 are clearly invalid, there are only two valid syllogistic 
forms of the first-figure: I.1 and I.2. 
 When we get to the other figures, things get slightly more complicated. 
First, we have to introduce a set of conversion rules, rules that allow us 
to convert premises in syllogisms into forms that allow the application 
of a syllogistic form of the first-figure. These conversion rules are: 
 No X is Y  1. ↔  No Y is X 
 Some X is Y  2. ↔  Some Y is X 
 All X are Y  3. ↔  Some X are Y (↔ Some Y are X) 21 
 Kant describes rule (3) as the rule that universal affirmative judgments 
can be converted (predicate and subject switched)  per  accidens , which 
means that they can be converted  only in one direction, to the corre-
sponding logically weaker particular affirmative judgment. Rule (3) can 
be thought of as the logical product of the traditional Aristotelian rule of 
sub-alternation 22 and rule (2), which converts particular affirmative judg-
ments. The rule of sub-alternation has the effect of ruling out vacuous 
universal affirmative judgments. If the concept <A> has no objects in its 
extension, then no true affirmative judgments can be made with it as 
the subject-concept. 
 A syllogism is valid if and only if it can be transformed, via the conver-
sion rules, into a categorical syllogism of one of the two kinds listed 
above (I.1 & I.2). Since the two kinds of valid first-figure categorical 
syllogisms are substitution-formal (I take it that this is obvious by inspec-
tion), and the conversion rules are substitution-formal (ditto), it follows 
that whether a syllogism is valid is substitution-formal. Although, I take 
it, the premises of this argument are obvious by inspection, it may be 
less obvious that the conclusion follows. Let S and S* be two syllogisms 
which are formally equivalent in the following sense: by consistent 
substitution of concepts, the premises and conclusion of S* can be trans-
formed into those of S. Note, though, that logical forms of judgments 
 21  JL §53, Ak. 9:119. 
 22  Kant discusses sub-alternation at  JL §46, Ak. 9:116. 
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are not concepts; otherwise, we could get the absurd result that <All A 
are B> has the same logical form as <Some A are B>. Assume that S is a 
valid syllogism. Then S is either already a syllogism of the first-figure, or 
it can be transformed into one by a series of application of conversion 
rules. If S is a first-figure syllogism, then so is S*, so S* is valid. If there is 
a series of applications of conversion rules that transforms S into a valid 
first-figure syllogism, then, the same series of applications of conversion 
rules will transform S* into a valid first-figure syllogism. So S* is a valid 
syllogism. I conclude that the property of being a valid categorical syllo-
gism is substitution-formal. 
 It is even clearer that the property of being a valid hypothetical or 
disjunctive syllogism is substitution-formal, for Kant’s theory of those 
syllogistic forms is simpler than in the case of the categorical. All hypo-
thetical syllogisms come in one of two forms: 
  H.1  H.2 
 Major  If  p then  q  If  p then  q 
 Minor  p  ~q 
 Conclusion  q  ~p 
 where  p and  q are any judgment whatsoever and ‘~p’ denotes the nega-
tive judgment in which the  copula in  p (not its predicate, as in infinite 
judgments – see above) is negated. Disjunctive syllogisms have one of 
two forms: 23 
  D.1  D.2 
 Major  A is (B 1 ∨B 2 ∨ ... ∨B n )  A is (B 1 ∨B 2 ∨ ... ∨B n ) 
 Minor  A is B j  ~(A is (B 1 ∨B 2 ∨ ... ∨B j-1 ∨ B j+1 ∨ ... ∨B n ) 
 Conclusion  ~(A is (B 1 ∨B 2 ∨ ... ∨B j-1  A is B j 
  ∨B j+1 ∨ ... ∨B n )
 As is clear from these syllogistic forms, Kant thinks of disjunctive judg-
ments in terms of what we would now call the ‘exclusive or’. Since 
disjunctive judgments can be either universal or particular in quantity, 
we should distinguish two different forms of the major premise, and 
thus multiple different kinds of disjunctive syllogism. However, for the 
sake of simplicity, I will just assume that the major premise is universal 
 23  JL §77.  
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and the minor is particular, and the conclusion retains the quantity of 
the major premise: 
  D.1U  D.2U 
 Major  All As are (B 1 ∨B 2 ∨ ... ∨B n )  All As are (B 1 ∨B 2 ∨ ... ∨B n ) 
 Minor  Some A is B j  ~(Some A is (B 1 ∨B 2 ∨ ... ∨ 
  B j–1 ∨ B j+1 ∨ ... ∨B n ) 
 Conclusion  ~(All A is (B 1 ∨B 2 ∨ ... ∨B j–1  All As are is B j  24 
  ∨B j+1 ∨ ... ∨B n )
 Once again, by inspection, it is clear that the property of being a valid 
hypothetical syllogism and the property of being a valid disjunctive 
syllogism are substitution-formal. 
 We could conclude, on Kant’s behalf, that the property of being a 
valid syllogism is substitution-formal because being a valid syllogism 
means being either a valid categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive syllo-
gism. However, this would be too quick for two reasons. Although Kant 
does not make this explicit, he should also count as mixed inferences 
of reason those syllogisms in which one premise immediately entails a 
premise that, together with the other premise, entails the conclusion by 
one of the syllogistic figures. For instance, consider this syllogism: 
 All M are P 
 If (some M are P) then (some R are Q) 
 ... Some R are Q 
 Intuitively, this is a valid syllogism because the first premise immediately 
entails (according to rule 3 above) that some M are P, which, together 
with the second, constitutes a valid hypothetical syllogism. However, 
the original syllogism is not a valid syllogism of any of the officially 
recognized forms. So I propose the following expansion of our notion 
of a valid syllogism:
 A pair of premises and a conclusion (P 1 , P 2 , C) are a valid syllogism if 
and only if P 1 , P 2 , and C instantiate one of the valid syllogistic forms, 
or if P1 or P2 immediately entail one or more judgments that, together 
 24  This is how I interpret Kant’s remark that “we infer either (1.) from the truth 
of one member of the disjunction to the falsehood of the others, or (2.) from the 
falsehood of all members but one to the truth of this one” ( JL §77, Ak. 9:130). 
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with C, instantiate such a form, or if P1, P2 and C* instantiate such a 
figure for some judgment C*, where C* immediately entails C. 
 But even taking this amendment on board, Kant has only given an 
account of entailment that holds between either a single premise and 
single conclusion (the immediate conversion rules from earlier, or 
“immediate inferences of reason”), or between a pair of premises and 
a single conclusion (syllogisms, “mediate inferences of reason”). For 
Kant’s logic to be adequate, it would need to account for general entail-
ment relations among arbitrary (perhaps arbitrarily large finite) sets of 
premises and conclusions. Here is a sketch of how that might go:
 Defn . The deductive closure of P 1 ...  P n is defined iteratively in stages: 
  (i)  At stage 0 we add P 1 ...  Pn. 
 (ii)  At stage n + 1 we add all immediate consequences of every judg-
ment added at stage n or earlier, and all judgments C such that 
judgments A and B (where A and B are added in stage n or earlier) 
and (A, B, C) instantiate a valid syllogistic form. 
 Defn . P 1 ...  P n entail C 1 ...  C n if and only if the deductive closure of P 1 
through P n includes each of C 1 ...  C n . 
 Therefore, despite the serious defects in Kant’s logic, his account of 
entailment is formal in precisely Bolzano’s sense: it is substitutional. 
Or, to put it as Bolzano does in §12 of  WL , the part of pure general 
logic that studies inferences of reason does not study individual ordered 
triples of judgments (propositions), but sets of such ordered triples: sets 
of ordered triples of judgments that share a logical form, meaning they 
can be obtained through consistent substitution of concepts from some 
abstract schema. This does not show that  all of Kantian pure general 
logic is substitutional; it shows, however, that a significant portion of 
that logic, the theory of inference, is substitutional, and this is the part 
of Kant’s logic that most closely corresponds to Bolzano’s theory of 
 Ableitbarkeit , which, in the previous section, we saw to be substitution-
formal as well. 
 §4 Form of the capacity versus form of the product of 
the capacity 
 Now I am going to argue that, while Kant does think that logic, para-
digmatically the part of pure general logic that studies inference, is 
substitution- formal, there is a more basic sense in which logic is formal, 
and that more basic sense explains why logic is substitution-formal. 
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 Understanding the precise meaning of Kant’s formality thesis can 
seem a daunting task, given the sheer variety of ways in which Kant 
characterizes the formality of logic: logic is said to concern the form of 
thought, the form of reason, the form of the understanding, the formal 
laws of the understanding, as well as the more familiar claims that it 
concerns the form of concepts, the form of judgments, or the form of 
inferences. The different forms that are relevant to the formality of logic 
can be roughly separated into two classes: forms of faculties (e.g. the 
form of understanding) and forms of products or activations of those 
faculties (e.g. the form of concepts, judgments, and inferences). 
 As numerous scholars have pointed out, Kant applies the matter/form 
distinction across a wide swath of his philosophy; concepts, experience, 
the will, etc. are all said to have a form and a matter. 25 In some contexts, 
by distinguishing between the form and the matter of some item, Kant 
is claiming that the item in question (e.g. a judgment) is a complex 
structured whole and distinguishing within that whole between its 
parts (its matter) and the structure that obtains among those parts (its 
form), in virtue of which those parts compose that very item. To apply 
the matter/form distinction, in these paradigm cases, requires distin-
guishing a class of items called  matter from a class of structural relations 
called  forms such that, when instances of the appropriate kind of matter 
are structured by an appropriate kind of form, a complex entity of the 
relevant kind exists. For instance, to talk of the matter/form distinction 
with respect to judgments requires distinguishing  concepts , the parts out 
of which judgments are made, from  logical forms , the structures that 
when applied to these concepts produce complex wholes,  judgments . A 
consequence of the matter/form distinction, when applied in paradigm 
cases like these, is that the very same matter could be structured by a 
different form, producing a different complex whole. For instance, the 
concepts <Greek> and <Athenian> could be structured in the judgment 
<All Athenians are Greek> or in the distinct judgment <Some Greeks are 
Athenian>. It is also a consequence of the matter/form distinction, when 
applied in paradigm cases like this, that the same form can produce 
distinct complex wholes by structuring different matter. For instance, 
the logical form of universal affirmative judgment structures the distinct 
judgments <All Athenians are Greek> and <All squares are equiangular>, 
because these judgments are made of different concepts (their matter is 
different). In these paradigm cases of the matter/form distinction, the 
 25  My thinking about the matter/form distinction in Kant is indebted to an 
unpublished paper by Matt Boyle, “Kant’s Hylomorphism”. 
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distinction is ultimately between the parts (matter) of some complex 
whole, and the structure (form) of that complex whole. I will call these 
cases the ‘standard hylomorphic cases’, because the distinction between 
matter ( hyle ) and form ( morphe ) can be applied here in a reasonably 
straightforward way. I take it that Kant’s application of the matter/form 
distinction to judgments and inferences are standard hylomorphic cases. 
I have already explained this in the case of judgments. The distinction 
between the matter and form of syllogisms follows directly from the 
theory of syllogistic inference in the previous section: the form of the 
syllogism is the syllogistic figure, while the matter is the particular judg-
ments (which themselves have a further form). 26 Kant also applies the 
matter/form distinction to concepts, but I will not explore that here, 
because it involves the complex doctrine that the form of concepts is 
“universality”. 27 
 One thing that leaps out about Kant’s ubiquitous use of the matter/
form distinction is that some of the things to which he applies the 
distinction are not standard hylomorphic cases. Some of things that are 
said to have a form and a matter are not very naturally thought of as 
complex structured wholes with parts. Very roughly, we can divide the 
cases into two kinds (with citations to relevant texts in parentheses): 
 Standard hylomorphic cases  Non-standard hylomorphic cases 
 Judgments (Ak. 9:101)  Understanding (Bx) 
 Inferences (Ak. 9:121)  Reason (Bx) 
 Intuition (A23/B37)  Sensibility (A20/B34) 
 Maxims (Ak. 5:28)  Will (Ak. 4:436) 
 Concepts (?) (Ak. 9:91)  Thought (A59/B84) 
 From this table we can see that the items that are not naturally thought 
of as complex structured wholes (the non-standard hylomorphic cases) 
are faculties or capacities, while the items that are standard hylomorphic 
cases are products of such faculties. For instance, a judgment, according 
to Kant, is an activation of the faculty of the understanding. A judgment 
 26  In  JL §59 Kant claims that the form of a syllogism is the conclusion “insofar 
as it contains the  consequentia ” (Ak. 9:121). I take this to mean: the conclusion 
qua consequence of those premises. But if the conclusion is a valid consequence 
then it is a consequence in virtue of it and the two premises instantiating a syllo-
gistic figure. So the point in the main text remains: the form is the syllogistic 
figure. 
 27  JL , Ak. 9: 91. 
 
Kant, Bolzano, and the Formality of Logic 211
is a complex structured whole, but it is very unnatural to think of the 
understanding  itself as having parts and a structure. Concepts are an 
intermediate case because, while they are products of a capacity, they 
are not  standard hylomorphic cases since, while they might be thought 
to consist in parts (marks) organized according to a form, Kant refers 
to the form of concepts, not as the logically complex manner in which 
they are arranged, but as their  universality ; whatever the ‘universality’ of 
concepts is, I take it, it is not a matter of their parts being related in some 
way, for even simple concepts are general and thus possess the form of 
universality. 
 Applying the hylomorphic analysis to faculties immediately leads to 
difficulties. What are the parts of the understanding? Are they other 
faculties? If so, why is understanding one of the basic faculties (rather 
than the faculties out of which it is composed)? If the parts of the under-
standing are not faculties, what could they be? I am going to take this 
as sufficient reason to at least  entertain the hypothesis that when Kant 
talks about the  form of the understanding (or of any other faculty) he 
does not mean the structure that obtains among the parts of the under-
standing (or of that other faculty). What, then, does he mean? 
 Before we address that question, though, we must first note some 
variation in Kant’s claims about which faculty’s  form logic is about; 
although he typically describes logic as concerning the form of  thinking 
(e.g. Bxxiii, A21/B36, A55/B79, etc.), he sometimes describes it as 
concerned with the form of  understanding (e.g. Bix, A59/B84), some-
times with the form of reason (e.g. Bxi), and sometimes with the form 
of understanding  and reason (e.g. A53/B77, A796/B824). One thing 
to note is that  thinking is not a faculty in its own right, according to 
Kant. Kant’s lists of faculties vary somewhat from text to text, but in 
the first  Kritik he seems to admit only four basic faculties: sensibility, 
understanding, (theoretical) reason, and the faculty of desire, practical 
reason (which, only briefly discussed in the first  Kritik , 28 forms the 
central topic of the second). In the third  Kritik he supplements this 
with a fifth faculty: the power of (reflecting) judgment [ Urtheilskraft ]. 29 
 28  The main discussion of practical reason in  KrV is in the Canon der reinen 
Vernunft, A797/B825–A820/B848. 
 29  In the A Deduction Kant appears to claim that imagination is one of “three 
original sources which contain the conditions of the possibility of experience 
and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind” (A94; cf. 
A115). However, already in the A Deduction (A119) and even more so in the B 
Deduction (B153), the synthesizing role of the imagination seems to be attributed 
to the understanding itself. 
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Thinking is not a separate faculty; it is a very general description that 
applies to the activities of both the understanding and reason because 
they are discursive, or conceptual. 30 Thinking is discursive cognition in 
general, a point Kant makes in passing: “since merely formal logic, so 
conceived, abstracts from all content of cognition (whether it be pure or 
empirical), and concerns itself with the form of thinking (of discursive 
cognition) in general” (A131/B170). 31 That understanding and reason 
are discursive/conceptual (and hence instances of thinking) means that 
activations of these faculties constitutively involve concepts: concepts 
themselves (both empirical and  a priori ), judgments (in the case of the 
understanding) and inferences (in the case of reason). In claiming that 
logic concerns the form of  thinking Kant is claiming that it concerns the 
form of discursive representation in general, of which understanding 
and reason are instances. In order to mark this distinction between 
thinking and the particular discursive faculties (understanding, reason) 
I will refer to thinking as a ‘capacity’: we possess the capacity to think 
in virtue of possessing the more determinate faculties of understanding 
and reason. 
 To return to our earlier question, one possibility would be to interpret 
Kant’s talk of the form of a faculty as shorthand for talk of the form of 
the products of its activity (which  are standard hylomorphic cases). So 
when Kant claims that logic concerns the form of thinking, what he 
means is that logic deals with concepts, judgments, and inferences (the 
products of the discursive faculties, understanding and reason) solely 
in virtue of their forms, that is, solely with features of, and relations 
among, these items that they possess in virtue of having the struc-
ture they do, and which they would share with any item that shared 
such a structure. On this reading, the formality of logic, for Kant, is 
very close to the formality of logic for Bolzano: logic does not concern 
itself with individual judgments or arguments, but with whole classes of 
 30  I take it that the ‘power of judgment’ [ Urtheilskraft ] is also conceptual 
(though not wholly conceptual – —see Ak. 5:214–217), in the minimal sense that 
its activities (reflecting judgments) are expressed with concepts, and hence is a 
faculty for thought normatively subject to logical laws (e.g. a logically contradic-
tory aesthetic reflecting judgment is impossible). However, since by 1787 Kant 
had not even formulated the project of a  Kritik of the faculty of reflecting judg-
ment, and whether logic applies to reflecting judgment is not thematized in the 
 Kritik der Urtheilskraft , this would be hard to substantiate from the text of either 
the first or the third  Kritik . 
 31  See also B93 and A230/B283. 
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structurally (formally) indistinguishable judgments or arguments. There 
are passages that suggest this reading, for instance:
 General logic abstracts, as we have seen, from all content of cogni-
tion, i.e. from any relation of it to the object, and considers only the 
logical form in the relation of cognitions to one another, i.e. the form 
of thinking in general. ( KrV , A55/B79) 
 One reading of this passage is that Kant is claiming that logic (a) abstracts 
from, or ignores, the matter (constituent concepts) of judgments, what 
their objects are, whether they even have objects, etc.; (b) considers only 
the relations that judgments have to one another when this content is 
abstracted from; and (c) he identifies the formality of logic with (b). This 
suggests that by ‘formal’ here Kant merely means that logic is concerned 
with relations (e.g. inferential relations) that hold between judgments 
in virtue of their logical form (“the logical form in the relation of cogni-
tions to one another”). This ‘reductive’ account of the form of thinking 
(i.e. reducing it to the form of its product) might be further encouraged 
by Kant’s claim that “we can trace all acts of the understanding back to 
judgments, so that the understanding in general can be represented as a 
faculty [ Vermögen ] for judging” (A69/B94). Kant seems to be claiming that 
we can understand what the understanding is by understanding what it 
does: judge. Consequently, it might be argued, talk of the form of the 
understanding is shorthand for talk of the form of its most basic activity, 
judgment. Likewise, on this interpretation, talk of the form of thought 
is shorthand for talk of the form of its most basic activities/products: 
concepts and judgments (understanding) and inferences (reason). 
 I think we should be sceptical of this ‘reductive’ reading of Kant’s 
talk of the ‘form of thinking’ because it leaves unexplained why Kant 
does not  only talk about logic as being about forms of judgments, infer-
ences, etc. (or about judgments, inferences, etc. in virtue of their form) 
but consistently and repeatedly claims that logic is about the form of 
thinking itself. If Kant only meant to convey that logic is about the forms 
of the products of this capacity why does he consistently and repeatedly 
claim that logic concerns the form of the capacity itself? In general, Kant 
does not restrict the hylomorphic analysis to the products of faculties, 
but consistently and repeatedly speaks of the forms of various faculties 
(see table above); if he meant the latter only to be a shorthand for the 
former, this is at least a very confusing way for him to express his point. 
This is a  prima facie reason to look for another explanation of Kant’s talk 
of the form of a faculty. 
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 In several places in his lectures on logic Kant employs a more general 
notion of form: 
 In every cognition we must distinguish matter, i.e. the object, from 
form, i.e. the manner in which we cognize the object. (Ak. 24:510) 
 In logic one abstracts from objects and regards only the form of the 
understanding, i.e. modus cognoscendi. (Ak. 24:616) 
 The second quote is from the Busolt Logik; a few pages later Kant distin-
guishes between matter and form and adds this parenthetical quali-
fication: “form (modus cognoscendi)” (Ak. 24:621). I call this a more 
‘general’ notion of form because it encompasses the more strictly hylo-
morphic notion of ‘form’: the modus cognoscendi of, e.g., a judgment 
is its logical form (in the hylomorphic sense) because the manner in 
which judgments cognize objects (form as modus cognoscendi) is by 
combining concepts according to that (hylomorphic) form. So in these 
texts at least Kant identifies form  in general with manner (or mode) of 
cognition. This is not, I think, a deviant or minor usage on Kant’s part. 
For even in the  Jäsche Logik Kant refers to the  form of concepts as univer-
sality (Ak. 9:91), and to an improvement in the distinctness of a cogni-
tion as a change in its logical  form (Ak. 9:64). 32 As I mentioned earlier, 
the  form of concepts (universality) cannot naturally be thought of in 
terms of the hylomorphic notion of form: universality is not a struc-
tural relation among the parts of a concept (its marks) because those are 
concepts and thus possess universality in their own right. Likewise, Kant 
describes the distinctness of a cognition, the degree to which its parts 
are consciously apprehended by the subject, as a difference in the form 
of the cognition. This cannot be understood on the hylomorphic anal-
ysis of form because  by definition the distinct and the indistinct cogni-
tion have the same parts organized in the same manner; the difference 
does not consist in the parts, or their manner of arrangement, but in the 
subject’s ability to consciously apprehend and differentiate them . 
 If we take this on board as Kant’s most general notion of form then 
we can say: logic concerns the  form of thinking because it concerns the 
manner of cognition involved in thought. This can sound extremely 
vague, since thinking can be done in many ways (many ‘modes’): judging, 
inferring, etc. The  modus cognoscendi of thinking is most naturally under-
stood as the mode of cognition common to thought as such, or, what all 
 32  Cf. Ak. 24:418, 512, 538, and 28:229.  
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thinking has in common in virtue of being thinking. If it referred merely 
to the accidental mode of our thinking (how we happen to think) then 
the study of the form ( modus cognoscendi ) of thought would be what Kant 
calls “applied logic” (a kind of empirical psychology), rather than “pure 
general logic”, the science of the absolutely necessary rules of thinking 
as such. So logic concerns the form of thought in this sense: it concerns 
the mode of cognition all thinking has in virtue of being thinking. This 
is exactly what Kant says about logic elsewhere: 
 [pure general logic] contains the absolutely necessary rules of 
thinking, without which no use of the understanding takes place. 
( KrV , A52/B76) 
 All rules according to which the understanding operates are either 
 necessary or  contingent . The former are those without which no use of 
the understanding would be possible at all, the latter those without 
which a certain determinate use of the understanding would not 
occur. ( JL , Ak. 9:12) 
 So the claim that logic concerns the form of thinking means that logic 
concerns the manner of cognition of thinking as such, which means it 
concerns the rules which thinking necessarily obeys, the rules without 
which thinking is not thinking. This, I take it, is what Kant means 
when he describes the laws of logic as the “essential” laws of the under-
standing (Ak. 16:44, 24:526), or as the understanding’s “own laws” 
(24:824). Logic does not concern the  modus cognoscendi thinking merely 
happens to have; it characterizes the laws that characterize the manner 
of cognition thinking has in virtue of being the capacity (of discursive 
representation) that it is. Since understanding and reason are essentially 
discursive capacities, logic also studies laws that describe the manner in 
which these faculties cognize their objects in virtue of being the facul-
ties they are. 
 Earlier, we saw that Kant claims that logical laws are necessary for 
thought. In the  Jäsche Logik he makes clear that this necessity is norma-
tive not descriptive: “in logic, the question is not about  contingent but 
about  necessary rules; not how we do think, but how we ought to think” 
( JL , 9:14). 33 It is not that we necessarily  do obey logical laws, but that we 
ought to. So if the form of thinking is the  modus cognoscendi of thinking 
 33  Cf.  Pölitz Logik 24:503;  Dohna-Wundlacken Logik 24:693;  Wiener Logik 24: 
792;  Refl . 1627. 
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itself, and this consists in laws that are normative for thought itself, 
then one thing the formality of logic might mean is: logic studies the 
normative laws that apply to thinking in virtue of being the capacity 
that it is. This, I take it, is what Kant means by claiming that “logic is to 
teach us the correct use of the understanding, i.e. that in which it agrees 
with itself” ( JL 9: 14), a claim echoed in his reference in the  Kritik to 
“general logical rules for the agreement of cognition with itself” (B116). 
Logic brings the understanding (or more generally, thinking) into agree-
ment with itself because it teaches the normative laws that apply to that 
capacity in virtue of being the capacity that it is. 
 Since ‘law’ carries the normative connotation of guiding one’s action 
(or, in this case, one’s thought) when I talk about ‘laws’ I mean the 
normativity of logic; e.g. the logical  law of non-contradiction is that 
one ought not to  judge that <A is ~A> is true. When I talk about logical 
‘rules’ I will mean the descriptive logical claims (e.g. that no judgment 
of the form <A is ~A> is true) that are transformed into normative claims 
in logical laws. Kant himself draws a similar distinction between laws 
and rules: 34 rules become laws when they are represented as necessary. 
Although Kant has descriptive natural laws in mind, we could adapt this 
to the logical context: logical  laws are logical rules thought as norma-
tively necessary. 
 I have outlined an alternative reading of one thing that Kant means 
by claiming that logic studies the form of thinking: it studies the  modus 
cognoscendi of thinking as such and thus discovers normative laws that 
apply to thinking in virtue of being thinking. I have also discussed the 
‘reductive’ interpretation of Kant’s talk of the form of thought, according 
to which Kant’s claim that logic studies the form of thinking means that 
logic studies the products of the capacity for thought – concepts, judg-
ments, inferences – in virtue of their form. It is a short step to understand 
the formality of logic’s study of these products in terms of substitution-
formality: for instance, logic only studies properties of inferences that 
are preserved under substitution of non-logical concepts. This reduc-
tive reading would make Kant’s claim that logic is formal very close 
to Bolzano’s claim that logic is substitutional. In the remainder of this 
section, I will explain why I think the reductive reading is untenable. 
 34  See A126, Ak. 5:184, and Refl. 5414. Cf. Kant’s claim in the  Grundlegung that 
“only law brings with it the concept of an  unconditional and objective and hence 
universally valid  necessity ” (Ak. 4:416). Kant has practical laws in mind here, but 
I think the same could be said of logical laws. 
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 Consider the following passage, one of the longest sustained discus-
sions of the formality of logic in the  Jäsche Logik :
 If we now put aside all cognition that we have to borrow from 
 objects and merely reflect on the use of the understanding as such, 
we discover those of its rules that are necessary without qualifica-
tion, for every purpose and without regard to any particular objects 
of thought, because without them we would not think at all. Thus we 
can have insight into these rules  a priori , i.e.,  independent of all experi-
ence , because they contain merely the conditions for the use of the 
understanding in general,  without distinction among its objects , be that 
use  pure or  empirical . And from this follows at the same time that the 
universal and necessary rules of thinking concern merely its form and 
never its matter. Therefore the science that contains these necessary 
and universal rules of thinking in general is merely a science of the 
form of our cognition through the understanding, or of thought. ( JL , 
9:12) 35 
 Kant begins by claiming that if we ignore the particular concepts 
involved in judgments we can discover the rules that necessarily apply 
to any thinking, no matter about what object or with what kinds of 
concepts. These rules are normative rules, logical laws. But Kant goes 
on to claim that we can have  a priori insight into these normative rules. 
‘Insight’ is a technical term for Kant. It means knowledge from an 
explanatory ground; insight requires not merely knowledge that some-
thing is the case, but knowledge  why it is the case. 36 So Kant is claiming 
that because the laws of logic are normative for thought as such we can 
have  a priori insight into them, i.e. we can know  why those normative 
rules of thought apply to all thinking as such. 
 He then concludes from this that these rules are  formal . Now the reduc-
tive reading faces a dilemma: what does Kant mean when he claims 
that “the universal and necessary rules for thinking concern merely its 
form”?  If he means that logic is substitution-formal, or that it concerns 
only properties of judgments, inferences, etc. that are preserved under 
substitution of non-logical concepts (matter), then in this passage Kant is 
 35  For a very different interpretation of this passage, see MacFarlane (2002), 46. 
 36  See Jäsche Logik (Ak. 9:65), Pölitz Logik (Ak. 24:539), Dohna-Wundlacken Logik 
(Ak. 24:730), Refl. 1866 (Ak. 16:141), Refl. 1955 (Ak. 16:169) and Refl. 2394 (Ak. 
16:342),  Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Ak. 5:27, 46, 47), and  Kritik der Urtheilskraft 
(Ak. 5:83). 
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 inferring the formality of logic (in this sense) from the  normativity (neces-
sity) of logic for all thinking as such. But we have already seen that Kant 
sometimes uses ‘form’ in a very general sense to refer to the  modus cogno-
scendi of some faculty, so this claim (the normativity of logical laws for 
thought as such) is a kind of formality claim (for Kant): logic studies the 
modus cognoscendi of thinking as such and thus its essential normative 
laws. On this reading, Kant is inferring substitution-formality from its 
normative-formality. On the other hand,  if the reductive reader of Kant 
interprets ‘formal’ in the second half of this passage as a restatement 
of logic’s normativity for thinking as such (normative-formality) then 
they have to admit that by the formality of logic Kant sometimes means 
what I take it to mean: it studies normative laws essential to thinking 
as such. I read the passage in the first way: Kant begins by asserting 
that logic studies the normative laws that apply to thinking as such 
(form in the sense of modus cognoscendi) and concludes from this that 
it studies the products of the capacity for thinking by abstracting from 
their differences in concepts and objects. Substitution-formality follows 
from normative-formality. 
 This passage from the  Pölitz Logik poses a similar interpretive dilemma:
 The rules without which one would not think at all are necessary. The 
contingent rules that depend upon a particular object of explanation, 
are as numerous as the objects. Because the understanding, which acts 
according to rules, is present in every thinking there must be rules are 
common to all thinking, regardless of the object, and which lie a the 
basis of every use of the understanding, without which it would not 
be possible; and these are necessary. They therefore contain the form 
of thinking. (Ak. 24:502) 
 Kant here infers from the fact that logic is normative (necessary) for all 
thinking, regardless of its object, that logic is formal. Does formal mean 
substitution-formal here? If so, Kant is inferring substitution- formality 
from normative-formality, which is precisely my thesis. If not, then Kant 
is not drawing a conclusion from the normative-formality in the final 
line but restating that thesis in new terms: it is formal (in the norma-
tive sense). This, again, confirms my claim that the formality of logic, 
in its most fundamental sense, means that logic concerns the form of 
thinking, that is, the laws that apply to thinking in virtue of being the 
capacity that it is, its “essential laws”. 
 Readers who favour the reductive interpretation might want to object 
at this point: granted that Kant sometimes infers the (substitution) 
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formality of logic from its normativity for thought as such, why should 
we think that the latter (normativity) claim is ever what he means by 
claiming that logic studies the form of thinking? Two points in reply. 
First, as we have seen, Kant repeatedly refers to the forms of faculties, but 
this notion of form is not well captured in hylomorphic terms (because 
faculties, standardly conceived, do not have parts) and he does have a 
more general notion of form:  modus cognoscendi . Thus, my reading gives 
us an explanation of why Kant talks of logic as studying the form of a 
faculty not just the forms of its products. Second, Kant sometimes talks 
about the formality of logic in a way that naturally invites my reading, 
but which is at best awkwardly interpreted on reductive lights: “logic is 
thus a self-cognition of the understanding and of reason, not in regards 
to their object, however, but merely in regard to form” ( JL , Ak. 9:14). 
By now, it should be clear how I interpret this claim; logic is genuine 
self-knowledge on the part of the understanding because logical knowl-
edge is knowledge of what norms the activity of the understanding is 
bound by in virtue of being the faculty it is (a discursive faculty). The 
reductive reader is forced to read it as follows: logic is self-knowledge of 
the understanding and of reason in that it is knowledge of normative 
laws that apply to the products of these faculties in virtue of the forms 
of those products. My objection is simply: this does not look like self-
knowledge on the part of understanding or of reason, but of knowledge 
of their products. This is an instance of a wider problem with the reduc-
tive reading: where Kant talks about (the form of) a faculty, the reductive 
reading has to interpret him as meaning the (form of) the products of 
that faculty. 
 The connection to Aristotle, from whom the matter/form distinction 
ultimately derives, can help us understand why Kant might have talked 
about the ‘form’ of thinking in this way. While Aristotle introduces 
matter and form in the  Physics in such a way that the notion of form 
( eidos ) seems closely tied to the shape ( morphe ) or structure of some 
complex whole, 37 in the  Metaphysics it is a wider notion. In its most 
general use, the form of a thing is its essence, the answer to the ques-
tion,  what is it ? 38 Consequently, things without matter can nonetheless 
have  forms (immaterial substances). In other words, the form of a thing 
makes it the thing it is. So, going back to Kant, if logic concerns the 
 37  Physics 190b15, 191a10, and 193a30. Cf.  On generation and corruption 335b6 
where he seems to use  morphe and  eidos interchangeably. 
 38  Metaphysics 1032b1–2, 1035b33–1036a2. 
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form of thinking, then logic concerns  what thinking is , or, to put the 
point more straightforwardly, whatever rules logic uncovers are rules 
that are grounded in  what it is to think . In other words, the rules of logic 
apply to thinking in virtue of  being the capacity it is . They are grounded 
in the essence (form) of this capacity. 39 To bring this back to the point 
I put aside above, when Kant claims that logic “teaches us the correct 
use of the understanding, i.e., that in which it agrees with itself” I take 
this to mean: the rules of logic describe how the understanding oper-
ates when it is operating correctly as the faculty that it is. This also 
explains how we can have  a priori insight into the rules of logic.  A priori 
insight into the rules of logic is not merely knowledge that they are 
valid, but knowledge of  why . We can know  why the rules of logic are 
valid by understanding what capacity the capacity for thinking is and 
why, when it operates correctly as the capacity that it is, it obeys these 
rules. 
 The conclusion of this line of thought is that to understand what the 
formality of logic means for Kant, we must understand (1) what the 
capacity for thought is, and (2) what, if any, normative laws apply to it 
in virtue of what it is. If those normative laws are the laws of logic, then 
we will have made significant progress in understanding what it could 
mean that logic concerns the form of thinking. 
 §5 Logic and the unity of apperception 
 Kant’s claims that logic studies the form of thought, the form of the 
understanding, and the form of reason means: each of these is a faculty 
of discursive representation and logical norms apply to discursive repre-
sentation in virtue of its form (in virtue of being the faculty it is). Why 
does it lie in the nature of discursive faculties that their activities are 
normatively subject to the laws of logic? We might expect Kant’s answer 
to have this structure: an explanation of why logical norms apply to 
discursive representation as such, which would entail that logical norms 
 39  I am not claiming that ‘form’ generally means essence, for Kant; as we have 
seen, a cognition changes its  form as it becomes more distinctly understood by a 
subject, but it makes no sense to say its essence has changed. The most general 
notion of form in logical contexts is that of  modus cognoscendi ; since thinking is a 
capacity, a capacity to cognize (represent) in a certain way, its modus cognoscendi 
characterizes what it is to  be that capacity, its essence. This is not true in general of 
things that had a modus cognoscendi (e.g. a concept had by a particular subject, 
which can have varying degrees of distinctness). 
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apply to the activity of the understanding. However, this is not what 
Kant does. He explains why logical norms apply to the activity of the 
understanding. He leaves it up to us to generalize from this to an expla-
nation of why logical norms apply to activities of discursive representa-
tion in general. So I will first give a reconstruction of Kant’s explanation 
of why logical norms apply to the activity of the understanding (in 
virtue of what that faculty is), and then I will explain how this general-
izes to discursive representation in general (thinking). 
 Some readers might be surprised at my claim that Kant “explains 
why logical norms apply to the activity of the understanding”. Where, 
they will ask, does Kant do anything of the sort? At three places in the 
Transcendental Deduction (two of which occur in footnotes!) he claims 
that the unity of apperception explains the possibility of logic. In each 
case, Kant’s remarks are brief and cryptic, so it is up to us to reconstruct 
how they might constitute an explanation: 
 [ ... ] the  logical form of all cognition necessarily rests on the relation-
ship to apperception as a faculty. (KrV, A117n) 
 And thus the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point to 
which one must attach all use of the understanding,  even the whole 
of logic and, after it, transcendental philosophy; indeed this faculty 
is the understanding itself. ( KrV , B133–134n) 
 The category presupposes combination. We must therefore seek this 
unity ...  someplace higher, namely in that which itself contains the 
ground of the unity of different concepts in judgments, and, with 
it, the possibility of the understanding,  even in its logical use . ( KrV , 
B131; underlining in all three quotes by NS) 
 I have argued that logic, for Kant, is a normative science. In these 
passages, Kant claims that the unity of apperception explains how this 
normative science is possible. I take this to mean two things: (i) the unity 
of apperception explains how it is possible to cognize logical laws; and 
(ii) the unity of apperception explains how it is possible that (norma-
tive) logical laws apply to us. If (ii) were false, the unity of apperception 
would not explain the possibility of logic: it would fail to explain why 
the claims of logic (claims that certain norms apply to our thinking) are 
true. If (i) were false, logical norms might apply to us, but we could not 
cognize this (nor could we cognize why they apply). I take this to entail 
that logic, the normative science, would not be possible. However, I will 
focus on (ii); the Kantian account of how logical cognition (cognition 
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of logical laws as normatively binding on our thought) is possible lies 
outside the scope of this essay. 
 Kant does not tell us explicitly how the unity of apperception does 
(i) or (ii). He leaves it up to us to reconstruct his reasoning. We need 
to explain why logical norms apply to us, e.g. why I stand under the 
norm that if I judge that  p , that  p →  q , and that ~ q then I ought to revise 
or reject at least one of my judgments. But now ask yourself, why am 
I bound by that norm? Why am I normatively required not to have 
inconsistent judgments? Consider Kant’s remark at B64 that:
 For although a cognition may be in complete accord with logical 
form, i.e., not contradict itself, yet it can still always contradict the 
object. The merely logical criterion of truth, namely the agreement 
of a cognition with the general and formal laws of understanding 
and reason, is therefore certainly the  conditio sine qua non , thus the 
negative condition of all truth; further, however, logic cannot go, and 
logic cannot discover by any touchstone the error that concerns not 
form but content. ( KrV , A59/B84) 
 If Kant is claiming that logic concerns the negative principles about 
truth (i.e. no thought that violates logical laws can be true), this does 
not get us any closer to understanding why logic is normative for us. 
If logic describes a set of principles that my thoughts cannot violate 
and still be true, we do not get an explanation of why logic is norma-
tive for us  unless we assume that truth (or at least non-falsehood) is 
the end of our thinking. This opens the space for a reconstruction of 
Kant’s reasoning that the unity of apperception explains the possibility 
of logic, where logic studies the norms that apply to the understanding 
in virtue of the faculty the understanding is (logical laws). The explana-
tion is: the faculty of understanding, because of the faculty it is, aims at 
non-falsehood. To put it another way, among the ends of the faculty of 
the understanding, one of them is non-falsehood. Logic describes the 
negative requirements that must not be violated if our thinking is going 
to satisfy one of its constitutive ends, non-falsehood. 
 Before continuing, I want to briefly explain what I mean by claiming 
that thought as such aims at non-falsehood rather than truth. In the 
 Kritik Kant defines truth as “the agreement of cognition with its object” 
(A58/B82). 40 The definite description “its object” presupposes that the 
 40  This definition of truth is echoed throughout the logic lectures: Ak. 24:391, 
525, 718, and 823, as well as Refl. 2162 and 2177. 
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cognition has an object. But not all thoughts are cognitions; some 
thoughts do not have objects. These thoughts are not  false . They do not 
fail to agree with their object; they simply lack objects and are thus not 
even  apt to be true or false (unless an object is provided for them). 41 This 
is confirmed by Kant’s corresponding account of falsity in the Philippi 
Logik:
 Falsity is either:  materialis or  formalis . Formal falsity is when a cogni-
tion contradicts itself, or does not agree with itself [ sich nicht paßt ]. 
(Ak. 24:391) 
 ‘Material’ falsity I take to refer to a cognition that does not agree with its 
object. But then what are we to make of a consistent (not formally false) 
thought that does not even have an object? It is not materially false, 
because it does not even have an object. Nor is it true, for the reasons 
given above. 
 The conditions under which an object can be given for a thought 
are specified in transcendental logic; 42 in particular, the thought must 
involve concepts of objects in space and time, because these are the 
forms in which objects are given to us. 43 Consequently, if thought as 
such aimed at  truth then the logic that studies the form of thought 
(and thus uncovers why logical norms apply to thought) would have 
to be transcendental logic. 44 But it is not; it is pure general logic. Logic 
is concerned with the laws that no thought can violate if it is going 
to be non-false. Obeying the laws of logic is obviously not sufficient 
to make a thought  true (for it might still lack an object), 45 but it isn’t 
 41  By denying the “truth-aptness” of objectless thoughts I am not talking about 
the contemporary notion of “truth-aptness” (that is involved in, for instance, 
debates about the truth-aptness of moral judgments). As I am using the term, it 
merely refers to the fact that such thoughts fail to satisfy the presupposition of 
Kant’s definition of truth (agreement with their object). 
 42  A55/B80. 
 43  In my reading, giving an object for thought (e.g. giving an object for a 
concept) is making that object available for thought in a way that (among other 
things) makes it possible to cognize that there is such an object. So it is possible 
that there  are objects of some of our concepts but which cannot be  given to us (we 
cannot intuit them), so we do not cognize these objects. For instance, there is a 
God (as Kant argues in the second  Kritik ), so the concept <God> has an object, 
although that object cannot be given to us (intuited). I do not have the space here 
to defend this interpretation. 
 44  A62/B87. 
 45  Kant makes this point at A59/B84 and again and again in the logic lectures. 
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even sufficient to make a thought truth-apt; a thought might obey all 
of the logical norms and still be objectless. For instance, the principle 
of contradiction (<No A is ~A>) is the highest principle of logic, but not 
every substitution instance of it is  true ; if A is an objectless concept, <No 
A is ~A> is neither true nor false. But no substitution instance of this 
principle is  false . 46 
 Nor is it the case that all discursive faculties constitutively aim at 
truth (where truth is understood as the agreement of a cognition with 
its object). The faculty of reason, as we have seen, is a discursive faculty, 
but reason’s constitutive end is not  truth but to find a condition for 
any given conditioned object and, in pursuit of this end, the faculty 
of reason forms the concept of an  unconditioned condition. 47 Since 
there are a variety of different relations of condition to conditioned 
(substance–accident, cause–effect, and totality–limitation), this gener-
ates several different representations of unconditioned objects: the 
unconditioned thinking substance (the object of rational psychology), 
the unconditioned cause of effects in space and time (the object of 
rational cosmology), and the unconditioned ground of all possibility 
(the object of rational theology). 48 But none of these representations 
can be given an object in intuition, the only way objects can be given to 
us. Consequently, these concepts cannot be involved in cognition. The 
constitutive activity of reason – the activity in which reason manifests 
itself as the capacity it is – is not about any object that can be given to 
us. So not only does reason  not constitutively aim at truth, it consti-
tutively aims at representations which are not even truth-apt, because 
they violate the conditions under which any representation can be a 
cognition (a representation to which an object is given) and thus be 
either a true or false representation of its object. 49 
 It is relatively clear that Kant thinks that (theoretical) reason has a 
constitutive end: to find a condition for any given conditioned object. 
It is more controversial to claim that understanding ( Verstand ) has a 
constitutive end, but this is one of the central claims of the third  Kritik . 
In both the published and the unpublished (‘first’) Introductions to that 
work, he argues that the ‘formal purposiveness’ of nature is an  a priori 
principle of reflecting judgment. He defines formal purposiveness as 
follows: “the correspondence of a thing with that constitution of things 
 46  Cf. A258/B314. 
 47  A307/B364. 
 48  A327/B384. 
 49  A329/B385. 
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that is possible only in accordance with ends is called the  purposiveness 
of its form” (Ak. 5:180). To say that X is purposive for Y is to say that 
X is only possible if X has an end, and that end furthers the end of Y. 
A thing is represented as formally purposive if its form (in this context, 
structure) is represented as being only possible if it has some end. That 
reflecting judgment represents nature as formally purposive means that 
reflecting judgment represents nature’s systematic form (e.g. its division 
into species and genus) as possible “only in accordance with ends”, that is 
to say, possible only under the assumption that this system of nature has 
some end. For what (or whose) end does reflecting judgment represent 
the systematic form of nature as purposive? Our capacity for cognition 
( Erkenntnisvermögen ), in other words, the understanding. 50 To represent 
nature’s systematic form as purposive for our  Erkenntnisvermögen means 
representing that systematic form as possible “only in accordance with 
ends”, namely ends that further the ends of our cognitive capacity. So 
to represent nature’s systematic form as purposive for our cognitive 
capacity presupposes that this cognitive capacity has  ends and that the 
systematic form of nature furthers those ends. This is what Kant means 
when he writes:
 since the lawful unity in a combination that we cognize as in accord-
ance with a necessary aim (a need) [ Absicht (einem Bedürfniß) ] of the 
understanding, but yet at the same time as contingent in itself, is 
represented as a purposiveness of the objects (in this case, of nature), 
thus the power of judgment [ ... ] must think of nature with regard to 
the latter in accordance with a  principle of purposiveness for our 
faculty of cognition. (Ak. 5: 184) 
 The systematic form of nature is contingent for our understanding 
because the understanding leaves open the possibility that the multi-
plicity of species and genuses in nature might be so great that we could 
never discover them (or empirical laws governing them). This systematic 
unity is not provided by the understanding, but it furthers a necessary 
aim, an end, of the understanding: to cognize empirical objects under 
laws (which requires species and genus concepts). This systematic form, 
therefore, is represented as purposive for the understanding: it serves the 
ends ( Zwecke ) of the understanding. That the systematic form of nature is 
represented by reflecting judgment as  purposive for our understanding is 
 50  Ak. 5:174.  
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repeated throughout the third  Kritik .  51 Something can be represented as 
purposive for any cognitive faculty only if that cognitive faculty has an 
end, so our understanding has an end: to cognize empirically given objects 
under empirically given concepts/laws. Clearly, understanding cannot 
achieve that end unless it forms logically consistent concepts and judg-
ments. So part of understanding’s constitutive aim is: non-falsehood. 52 
 When I say that ‘thought as such aims at non-falsehood’ I mean that 
non-falsehood is a constitutive end of the capacity for thought (discur-
sive representation in general). I have argued that (theoretical) reason 
and understanding have non-falsehood among their constitutive ends 
(more precisely, that non-falsehood is a component of their constitutive 
ends). Since understanding and reason are the two discursive faculties, 
I take this to be sufficient evidence that non-falsehood is among the 
ends of discursive thought as such. It does not  entail this conclusion; it 
is compatible, strictly speaking, with these facts that, although under-
standing and reason do aim at non-falsehood, this is not part of what 
makes them discursive faculties. I will ignore that possibility in what 
follows. 
 I have begun reconstructing Kant’s explanation of how the unity of 
apperception explains the bindingness of logical laws upon discursive 
representation by arguing that discursive representation (thought) as 
such has a certain end – non-falsehood – and that logical laws relate to 
the fulfilment of this end. But in order to understand how some norma-
tive laws might apply to a certain representational activity with a given 
end (or ‘aim’) we must understand the relation between those norma-
tive laws and that end. This is perhaps the place where Kant leaves the 
most to his readers’ reconstruction. I am going to assume what I take 
to be the following minimal conditions: the negative rules our thought 
must satisfy to achieve one of its constitutive ends (non-falsehood), 
described at A59/B84, become normatively binding on us (they become 
logical  laws ) only if (i) we are capable of following or not following 
them (ought implies can), 53 and (ii) capable of representing ourselves as 
 51  Cf. Kant’s repeated references to the  a priori principle of the “purposiveness 
of nature for our cognitive faculty ( Erkenntnisvermögen )” (e.g. Ak. 5:182, 184, 185, 
186). 
 52  It is not merely that non-falsehood is a means to the end of the under-
standing; the understanding aims to cognize empirical objects, that is, to cognize 
them  accurately and logical consistency (non-falsehood) is a constituent of that 
end (see above), not merely a means towards it. 
 53  A principle to which Kant appears to be committed at A548/B576. 
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either following or not following them, and (iii) allowing the capacity 
mentioned in (ii) to guide the activity of the capacity mentioned in (i). 
For a normative law to apply to the activity of some capacity, it not only 
has to be something we both can satisfy and can fail to satisfy, but we 
must be able to represent ourselves as failing to do so, and our repre-
sentation of the law has to be part of the explanation of why we do or 
do not fail to satisfy the law. In other words, our representation of our 
activity as satisfying or failing to satisfy the law cannot simply be  passive ; 
we must be able to actively bring our activity into agreement with the 
law  because of our representation of the law. If we are merely capable of 
 observing whether our activity agrees with the putative law, but not of 
modifying that activity in light of its agreement or non-agreement with 
the putative law, then that law lacks normative force for our activity (it 
is not a ‘law’ in the sense defined above). Kant, as I have interpreted 
him, claims that the unity of apperception explains how logical laws can 
be normatively binding on us. Although he does not spell it out for us, it 
is not difficult to find a plausible story in the Transcendental Deduction 
about how the unity of apperception does this. 
 Kant states at the beginning of §16 of the B Deduction that “the  I think 
must be able to accompany all of my representations”. 54 To ‘accompany’ 
a representation with the ‘I think’ is to explicitly attend to that repre-
sentation as  my representation. This means that my representations 
have a certain kind of unity, albeit in a very minimal sense of ‘unity’ 
(although the unity required for self-consciousness will be strengthened 
significantly over the course of the Deduction): I can explicitly attend to 
them as  my representations, while I cannot do so to your representations 
(although you can). Kant calls this ‘unity of apperception’. Clearly, unity 
of apperception involves unity of consciousness. I can become explic-
itly conscious of any of my representations (accompany them with 
the ‘I think’); I can direct my awareness at any of my representations. 
However, unity of apperception means more than that. For if that were 
all there is to the unity of apperception, I might have unity of appercep-
tion even though I am in general totally unaware of my representations 
but could direct my attention to them at will. Unity of apperception 
requires that, even when I am not consciously attending to my repre-
sentations, I am still implicitly aware of them. In other words, it requires 
 54  There is an extensive literature on the B Deduction, the notion of appercep-
tion, and, indeed, this very sentence. I do not have space in this essay to engage 
with it. However, I have learned much from Longuenesse (1998) and the discus-
sion of apperception in Van Cleve (1999). 
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that were I to explicitly attend to one of them, that explicit attention 
would be an activation of some awareness of that representation that 
was already in place. 
 In §17 Kant extends this analysis by claiming that the representa-
tional manifold in an intuition (an immediate singular representation 
of an object) must have the unity of apperception; so far, this is a direct 
consequence of the claims of §16. He goes further, though, in claiming 
that if I am conscious of a unity of representations constituting an intui-
tion of an object – as I must be if that manifold stands under the unity 
of apperception – then I must ‘unite’ those representations in a concept 
of an object. In other words, if I am consciously intuiting an object, 
and that intuition is composed of a manifold of representations, then I 
must be conscious of those representations (though perhaps not explic-
itly) and ‘unite’ them (though perhaps not explicitly) under a concept 
by thinking of them as a manifold of representations that compose an 
intuition of an object of a particular kind. For instance, if I consciously 
visually perceive a dog running across my yard, then I am conscious 
of that perception as composed of overlapping perceptions of the dog 
at different temporal intervals, and I am conscious of those overlap-
ping perceptions as united under the concept ‘dog’. This conceptual 
unity among a manifold of representations is something my mind does 
(though I may not be explicitly attending to it). I do not passively receive 
this information from the senses; the fact that my total perceptual expe-
rience includes as part of its content that this manifold of represen-
tations is a manifold of representations of a  dog is due to my mental 
 activity . 55 Two points are crucial here. First, because I unify this manifold 
of representations under a  concept (a general representation) I can do so 
incorrectly. Second, because this unity is effected by an act of my mind, I 
can be subject to normative criticism if I make an error. If I did not unify 
this manifold through a general representation (a concept) but only by 
some essentially indexical or demonstrative representation (e.g.  that-
there ) then I could not in principle go wrong: for whatever I am intuiting 
is  that-there . By unifying the manifold through a general representation, 
though, I open my act to the possibility of  error because I represent the 
object of the intuition as having the general features constitutive of the 
concept; if the object turns out not to have one of those features, I have 
incorrectly unified the manifold. Similarly, if my senses (without any 
input from the understanding or apperception) represented the object 
 55  B129–130.  
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of the intuition as a dog, then if the object turned out not to be a dog, 
I could be said to have misperceived, but normative criticism would be 
out of place. It would be wrong to say I should  not have seen it as a dog 
if my senses simply deceived me. As it is, I might represent a manifold 
of representations of an object under the concept ‘dog’ but then upon 
receiving more information see that it is not a dog (‘dog’ was the wrong 
concept under which to unify those representations), for the object is 
actually a wolf. The objective unity of apperception, the unity a mani-
fold of conscious representations is to have if it is going to be about an 
intuited object, brings in the possibility of normative evaluation of our 
following of conceptual rules. 56 
 For our purposes, the key text here is §19 of the B Deduction, “The 
logical function of all judgments consists in the objective unity of the 
apperception of the concepts contained therein.” After an initial para-
graph in which he rejects the “explanation that the logicians give of a 
judgment in general” Kant explains his own view in the second para-
graph, beginning with the crucial claim that “a judgment is nothing 
other than the way to bring given cognition to the  objective unity of 
apperception” (B141f). The objective unity of apperception was origi-
nally introduced by Kant as a unity among manifold representations 
in an intuition, but here he extends it to a manifold of concepts in a 
judgment. This means that Kant’s claim that “a judgment is nothing 
other than the way to bring given cognitions to the  objective unity of 
 56  Contrary to appearances, this is not only compatible with Kant’s repeated 
claim that the senses do not  judge , but in fact expresses the very same point 
(from a different direction). One finds repeated throughout the lectures on logic 
a similar story about the possibility of error: the senses by themselves do not 
err (because they do not judge, a point made in the  Kritik at A293/B350) and 
the understanding by itself would not err (e.g. Ak. 24:526–527, 720, 824). The 
origin of error is in the interaction of sense and understanding. But if we take 
seriously the claim of the Transcendental Deduction that “all manifold, insofar 
as it is given in one empirical intuition, is determined in regard to one of the 
logical functions of judgment” (B143) then some function of judging is active 
in any perceptual consciousness of an object that can belong to the unity of 
apperception, i.e. be a representation this “for me” (B132). I take this to mean 
that conscious perceptual awareness of objects in our environment is the joint-
product of passive reception of sensory materials (sensibility, which does not 
judge, and thus does not err) and the synthetic activity of the understanding. If 
this is correct, then given that Kant locates the possibility of error in the interac-
tion of sensibility and understanding, it follows that consciousness perceptual 
awareness of objects in our environment can  err (unlike mere passive receipt of 
sensory matter). 
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apperception” means that a judgment is nothing other than the way 
to unite concepts together so that they possess the objective unity of 
apperception. Just as the manifold of an intuition is consciously united 
in a concept of the intuited object, Kant claims, concepts are consciously 
united in a judgment that asserts a relation between their domains. This 
is what distinguishes a judgment from mere ‘association’: when I judge 
<All S are P> I am not merely having an associative episode involving 
the concepts <S> and <P>. I am making a claim about objects. 
 The natural question is, what in the case of judgment plays the 
unifying role played by the concept in the case of intuitions? Kant’s 
answer is “that is the aim of the copula  is in [judgments]: to distin-
guish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective” 
(B141–142). Kant’s reference to ‘is’, however, is disappointing, for we will 
look in vain among the table of logical functions of judgment for ‘is’. I 
think Kant’s point, though, is that all judgments  as such are unified by 
the copula, and the different logical functions of judgment are different 
ways of determining the copula. 57 But just as in the case of the synthesis 
of a manifold of representations in an intuition, two points are crucial: 
in judging, our minds are active, not passive; and the ‘copula’ by which 
we unify concepts into a judgment introduces the possibility of  error . 
Combining those two points, the fact that judgments are acts of the 
mind and that we can incorrectly unify concepts into judgments opens 
the possibility of normative criticism of our judgmental acts. That judg-
ment is an  act means merely that our judgmental representations (our 
representations whose content is judgmental) are not passively received 
by the senses: if the impact of the world on my sensory organs by itself 
made it the case that I believe that there is a dog in front of me, it 
would be wrong to normatively criticize me for this judgment. I might 
be wrong that there is a dog in front of me, but it would not be the case 
that I  ought not to have judged that. 
 The question then is, how can the copula be wrong? In other words, 
how can I be incorrect in synthesizing two concepts <A> and <B> into 
the judgment <A is B>. Well, there are lots of ways I can be wrong! But in 
this essay we are interested in a very specific way I can be wrong: a way 
I can be wrong that does not depend upon which particular concepts 
<A> and <B>  are . The principle of contradiction is one such rule. If <B> 
=<~A>, then <A is B> is a false judgment, regardless of what concept 
 57  Cf. B332/A266, Ak. 9:104, Ak. 17:344. See however  JL §25 where Kant claims 
that in hypothetical judgments “ Consequenz ” takes the place of the copula. 
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<A> is. So, it might be thought, that my judgment that <A is ~A> can 
now be seen to be subjective to normative criticism: the judgment is an 
 act of mine (I synthesized it, rather than passively receiving it from the 
senses), and the judgment is  false . 
 But this  only issues in an explanation of why I am subject to norma-
tive criticism in judging <A is ~A> if we assume that: (i) <A is ~A> is false, 
regardless of what concept A is, and (ii) a judgment is subject to norma-
tive criticism if it is false. In other words, we need to assume (i) that the 
principle of contradiction is  true regardless of the concepts involved, 
that (ii) that thought as such aims at  non-falsehood and that thoughts 
that are false are subject to normative criticism in virtue of failing to 
be non-false. The philosophical lessons of this are that we can derive 
from the unity of apperception an explanation of why logical norms 
apply to all thought as such, but only if we assume the truth of the 
principle of contradiction. This means that the unity of apperception 
does not explain  why the principle of contradiction is true; at most, it 
explains why the principle of contradiction normatively constrains all 
thought as such. But if we take seriously Kant’s claim that the “entirety 
of logic” is attached to the unity of apperception and explained by it, 
this entails that (what Kant calls logic) does not explain why the prin-
ciple of contradiction is  true . Logic does not explain why there are no 
true contradictions, but why  we are normatively bound not to have any 
internally contradictory thoughts. The unity of apperception explains 
the normativity, not the truth, of logic. 
 Now we can give a unified account of how the unity of apperception 
explains why logical norms apply to all thought as such. Thought consti-
tutively aims at non-falsehood. Logical laws describe the negative condi-
tions on non-falsehood; no thought can violate these principles and still 
be non-false. Because judgments and the concepts that compose them 
stand under the unity of apperception, these judgments are the product 
of synthesis by the judging subject (they are spontaneously generated, 
 not passively received). The synthesizing of concepts into judgments 
involves uniting them under what Kant calls the ‘copula  is ’ in §19 of 
the B Deduction, which, I argued, is the genus of which different logical 
functions are the species (the different logical functions are determinate 
forms of the general copula). Consequently, judgments can be incorrect 
or correct in the following minimal sense: they can obey or not obey the 
logical principles (principles of non-falsehood) specified in terms of the 
various logical functions. But all of this stands under the unity of apper-
ception; so the judging subject is aware of the judgments he or she is 
making, and can be aware of their agreement or non-agreement with the 
232 Nicholas F. Stang
logical principles. Furthermore, since these judgments themselves are 
spontaneous (not passive), the judging subject’s consciousness (apper-
ception) of these judgments can be efficacious in modifying or rejecting 
these judgmental acts. In other words, the subject can modify his or her 
spontaneous judgmental acts in light of her apperceptive awareness of 
their agreement or disagreement with logical principles. These logical 
principles articulate negative conditions on thought’s satisfaction of 
its constitutive end: non-falsehood. So, I conclude, these logical rules 
obtain the status of norms for all thought as such. The unity of apper-
ception explains why logical principles are normative for thought, why 
they are  laws . 
 To bring this discussion full circle, this also explains why logical norms 
are formal in Bolzano’s sense, namely, why they are substitution-formal. 
It is because the rules of logic are substitution-formal: they can be speci-
fied as abstract schemata from which determinate rules for particular 
concepts and judgments can be obtained through substitution of 
determinate concepts for concept-variables. I argued in Section §2 that 
the most worked-out part of Kant’s logic – the theory of inference – is 
substitution-formal. These logical principles become norms for thought 
because they specify negative principles that any thought must satisfy 
in order to be non-false, and non-falsehood is the constitutive aim of 
thought as such. The unity of apperception then explains how these 
principles obtain the status of norms for the discursive representational 
acts of judging subjects, and since the principles are substitution-formal, 
the resulting norms are substitution-formal as well. Consequently, we 
can agree with Bolzano that the Kantian thesis of the formality of logic 
“ scheint noch nicht deutlich zu  seyn ”, for Kant has left to us much of the 
work of rendering it clear, but there is at least room to disagree whether 
it is “ nicht richtig genug entschieden ”. 58 
 Abbreviations for works of Kant 
 A/B  Kritik der reinen Vernunft , Ak. 3 & 4. Cited by page number in 1st 
edition of 1781 (A) and 2nd edition of 1787 (B). Translations gener-
ally follow Kant (1997), with occasional alterations. 
 58  I’d like to thank Sandra Lapointe and Clinton Tolley for reading, and 
commenting on, an earlier draft of this essay. I’d also like to thank Jack Woods, 
Catharine Diehl, Reed Winegar, James Kreines, Franz Knappik, Tobias Rosefeldt, 
Peter Yong, Bianca Ancillotti, and the other members of the Colloquium for 
Classical German Philosophy at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin for a very helpful 
discussion. 
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 Ak.  Kant (1905). Cited by volume and page number (e.g. Ak. 29: 
1034). 
 KrV  Kritik der reinen Vernunft , Ak. 3 & 4. Cited by page number in 1st 
edition of 1781 (A) and 2nd edition of 1787 (B). Translations 
generally follow Kant (1997), with occasional alterations. 
 JL  Jäsche Logik , Ak. 9. Translations generally follow Kant (1992), 
with occasional alterations. 
 Refl.  Kants handschriftlicher Nachlass (‘Reflexionen’) in Ak. 14–18. Cited 
by four digit number. 
 Where no translation is listed, translations are my own. 
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